Government Documents, Memos

Downing Street Memo
http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/

• A document containing meeting minutes transcribed during the British Prime Minister's meeting on July 23, 2002. This meeting was held a full 8 months PRIOR to the invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003. The Times of London printed the text of this document on Sunday, May 1, 2005. When asked about the document's validity, "British officials did not dispute the document's authenticity."

• Here is the text of key sections: "C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action....
  "The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
  "The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
  "The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
  "The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors....
  "The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush."

Letter from 89 Congress Members to President Bush, drafted by Congressman John Conyers, May 5, 2005.
http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/letters/bushsecretmemoltr5505.pdf

• This letter provides useful analysis of the Downing Street Memo, and also notes that "a separate secret briefing for the meeting said that Britain and America had to 'create' conditions to justify a war." The letter cites as a source for this: Michael Smith, "Blair Hit by New Leak of Secret War Plan," The Sunday Times - Britain, May 1, 2005, which in fact contains those words.

Representative Barbara Jordan’s opening statement to the House Judiciary Committee on July 25, 1974, http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/barbarajordanforum/PDFs/PDF_Opening%20Statement%20to%20the%20House%20Judiciary%20Committee.pdf

• On July 25, 1974, then-Representative Barbara Jordan spoke to her colleagues on the House Judiciary Committee of the constitutional basis for impeachment. “The powers relating to impeachment,” Jordan said, “are an essential check in the hands of this body, the legislature, against and upon the encroachment of the Executive.” Impeachment, she added, "is chiefly designed for the President and his high ministers to somehow be called into account. It is designed to ‘bridle’ the Executive if he engages in excesses. It is designed as a method of national inquest into the conduct of public men. The framers confined in the Congress the power, if need be, to remove the President in order to strike a delicate balance between a President swollen with power and grown tyrannical and preservation of the independence of the Executive."

President Bush’s March 18, 2003, formal letter and report to Congress: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-1.html

• The President submitted this formal letter and report to the United States Congress within forty-eight hours after having launched the invasion of Iraq. In the letter, dated March 18, 2003, the President makes a formal determination, as required by the Joint Resolution on Iraq passed by the U.S. Congress in October 2002, that military action against Iraq was necessary to "protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq..."

Bolton Hearings

White House Website